University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law

2008

Bayview Irrigation District et al. v. United Mexican
States: NAFTA, Foreign Investment, and
International Trade in Water - A Hard Pill to
Swallow
David M. Quealy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Quealy, David M., "Bayview Irrigation District et al. v. United Mexican States: NAFTA, Foreign Investment, and International Trade in
Water - A Hard Pill to Swallow" (2008). Minnesota Journal of International Law. 110.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/110

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.

Cite as: 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 99 (2008)
Comment
Bayview Irrigation District et al. v. United
Mexican States: NAFTA, Foreign

Investment, and International Trade in
Water-A Hard Pill to Swallow
David M. Quealy*
It is
Fresh water is essential to all life on earth.'
indispensable to the very existence of human beings and to the
ecosystems, agriculture, industry, and development which
sustain the modern world.2 Unfortunately, freshwater is both
scarce and unevenly distributed.3 Only about 2.5% of the
world's water is fresh, with only 0.3% of that being accessible to
humans.4 This means that less than one tenth of one percent of
the world's water is available to sustain human life. To make
matters worse, nine countries hold 60% of the world's fresh
water resources, while many others are forced to depend almost
entirely on foreign water resources.5
This scarcity and
. J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2008; B.S., University of
Utah, 2005. The author would like to thank the editors of the Minnesota Journal of
InternationalLaw for their comments and insights, and especially his wife, Audrey,
for her tireless love, support, and guidance throughout law school and while writing
this article.
1. ANTOINETTE HILDERING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
AND WATER MANAGEMENT 1 (2004). "Freshwater resources are those resources that
contain water with such a low level of salt that they are suitable for uses such as
drinking." Id. at 21.
2. Id. at 1, 21-26.
3. Urs Luterbacher & Ellen Wiegandt, Cooperation or Confrontation:
Sustainable Water Use in an International Context, in FRESH WATER AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 11, 12 (Edith Brown Weiss, et al. eds., 2005).
4. HILDERING, supra note 1, at 21. Further, most of this water is ground
water and only a small percentage can be found in lakes and streams. Id.
5. Luterbacher & Wiegandt, supra note 3.
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inequitable distribution is currently causing 29 counties to
experience severe water shortages, leaving 1.1 billion people
without clean drinking water and 2.4 billion without water for
sanitation.' For this reason, water could very well become the
source of significant international conflicts in the future.7
While there is currently no consensus regarding how best to
mitigate the potential for international water conflict,
commodification 8 of fresh water is often advocated as a means of
alleviating water shortage and more equitably distributing it
across the globe. 9 Within this context, there is an emerging
debate as to whether free flowing fresh water should be
considered a good or commodity subject to international trade
law, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). ° Determining whether fresh water should fall under
the rubric of international trade law is of great importance to
domestic and international policy makers and to civil society as
a whole.1" If fresh water-particularly fresh water flowing in
rivers across international borders-is subject to international
trade law, efforts to allocate water by treaty, manage domestic
water supplies, and regulate property rights could be seriously
compromised.'2
Thus, subjecting free flowing freshwater to
international trade law could possibly exacerbate the potential
for international conflict over water-rather than alleviate itby confusing the existing system of water allocation and dispute
resolution.
This Comment analyzes whether fresh water flowing in its
6. Rona Nardone, Like Oil and Water: The WTO and the World's Water
Resources, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 183, 183 (2003).
7. E.g., Luterbacher & Wiegandt, supra note 3, at 11-12, 19-33; Patricia
Wouters, Editor's Forward to INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF
PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE xiii-xxvi (Patricia Wouters ed., 1997).
8. "'Commodification' is the process of converting a good or service formerly
subject to many non-market . . . rules into one that is primarily subject to market
rules." Nardone, supra note 6, at 183 n.21.
9. See generally CONTINENTAL WATER MARKETING (Terry L. Anderson, ed.
1994) (discussing ways water can be commodified in North America); GARY D.
LIBECAP, RESCUING WATER MARKETS: LESSONS FROM OWENS VALLEY (2005),
available at http://www.perc.org/pdf/ps33.pdf (arguing that water markets benefited
the American West); SHARING SCARCITY: GAINERS AND LOSERS IN WATER
MARKETING (Harold 0. Carter et al. eds., 1994) (discussing the California water
market).
10. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
See generally, FRESH WATER AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW at Ch. 1-3 & 10-15 (Edith Brown Weiss et al. eds.,
2005).
11. Edith Brown Weiss, Introduction to FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 10 at 2.
12. Id.
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natural state across an international border should be
considered a good or product subject to intentional trade law
through a case study of Bayview Irrigation District et al.'3 v.
United Mexican States, an unprecedented request for an
"investor-state" arbitration under article 1120 of NAFTA.'4 The
case was filed by a group of Texas water users and irrigation
districts ("Claimants" or "Bayview") on January 19, 2005.'" The
Claimants sought arbitration of their allegations that Mexico
has violated Chapter 11, Articles 1102, 1105, and 1110, of
NAFTA.' 6 They claim Mexico has violated NAFTA by capturing,
seizing, and diverting, for use by Mexican farmers,
approximately 1,219,512 acre-feet' 7 of naturally flowing Rio
Grande irrigation water that originates in Mexico and is
allegedly owned by the Claimants. 8 They allege ownership of
the water under a 1944 treaty between the United States and

13. All claimants are: Bayview Irrigation District #11; Brownsville Irrigation
District; Cameron County Irrigation District #2; Cameron County Irrigation District
#6; Delta Lake Irrigation District; Donna Irrigation District Hidalgo County #1;
Engelman Irrigation District; Hidalgo County Irrigation District #1; Hidalgo County
Irrigation District #2; Hidalgo County Irrigation District #5; Hidalgo County
Irrigation District #6; Hidalgo County Irrigation District #16; Hidalgo & Cameron
County Irrigation District #9; La Feria Irrigation District Cameron County #3;
Santa Maria Irrigation District Cameron County #4; United Irrigation District;
Valley Acres Irrigation District; Arthur E. Beckwith; W.G. Ball Jr. Trust; Luther
Bradford; Capote Farms, Ltd.; Estate of E.F. Davis, Jr.; Richard Drawe; Electric Gin
Co. of San Benito; Odus D. Emery, Jr.; Willard Fike; Fike Farms; Fuller Farms;
N.H. Kitayama; Krenmueller Farms; Moore & Sons Farms Inc.; North Alamo Water
Supply Corp.; Bernadette M. Oeser; Donald Phillipp; Francis Phillipp; Pine Tree
Conservation Society; Timothy Reid and Estates of Jesse Reid and Norman Reid;
Juan F. Ruiz; James D. Russell; Sam Sparks, L.P.; Gregory Schreiber; Rita
Schreiber; Charles Shofner; Theimer Trust; and Julie G. Ulhorn.
14. Claimants' Request for Arbitration Under the Rules Governing the
Additional Facility for the Admin. of Proceedings by the Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of
Inv. Disputes and the N. Am. Free Trade Agreement at 25-26, 40, Bayview
Irrigation Dist. et al. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/1 (Jan.
19, 2005), available at http://naftaclaims.com/DisputesfMexico/Texas/TexasClaims
_NOA-19-01-05.pdf. Claimants' petition has been declined by the Arbitral Tribunal.
Bayview Irrigation Dist. et al. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/05/1 (June 19, 2007). Claimants have appealed in the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice. Notice of Application, Bayview Irrigation Dist. et al. v. United
Mexican States, No. 07-CU-340139 PD2 (Ont. S.C.J. Sept. 17, 2007).
15. Request for Arbitration,ICSID Case. No. ARB(AF)/05/1 at 1-24.
16. Id. at 30-32.
17. An acre-foot of water is the amount of water it would take to cover one acre
of land with water one foot deep, approximately 325,850 gallons of water. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 25-26 (8th ed. 2004).
18. Request for Arbitration, ICSID Case. No. ARB(AF)/05/1 at 32. The Rio
Grande river originates partially in the United States and partially in Mexico, which
forms the border between the southwest Texas and Mexico. Earth Observatory,
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Study/RioGrande/Images/rio-grande.gif.
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Mexico that allocates the water of the Rio Grande.' 9 The
Claimants sought $667,687,930 in damages for the claimed
NAFTA violations.20
Part I of this Comment describes the relevant legal and
factual framework for the Bayview dispute. It reviews NAFTA's
investor-state dispute resolution mechanism; the 1944 Treaty
between the United States and Mexico; and the water debt
which Mexico accrued under the 1944 treaty. Part II considers
the arguments for using international trade law to regulate free
flowing international waters by discussing Bayview's arguments
for considering the international waters of the Rio Grande an
investment subject to NAFTA's Chapter 11 regulations. Part III
of applying
consequences
the problematic
addresses
international trade law to the regulation of free flowing
international waters. It does so by analyzing the problems
inherent in Bayview's arguments for applying NAFTA Chapter
11 to the waters of the Rio Grande. Finally, this Comment
concludes that treating water that is flowing in its natural state
as a good and subjecting it to international trade law when it
and
dangerous
is
a
borders
international
crosses
counterproductive undertaking. Such an approach overextends
the scope of international trade regimes such as NAFTA, risks
usurping nation-states' territorial sovereignty, fosters forum
shopping for favorable dispute resolution mechanisms, and
allows trade bodies to unilaterally rewrite water allocation
treaties.
I. FRAMEWORK OF THE BAYVIEW DISPUTE
A. RELEVANT NAFTA PROVISIONS

NAFTA was signed by the United States, Mexico, and
Canada on December 17, 1992.2"

It was intended to remove

barriers to trade in goods and services between the three
countries, while preserving the parties' sovereignty over their
territory and substantive law.22 The parties hoped NAFTA
19. Id. at 32.
20. "Claimants seek full compensation for the 914,641 acre-feet of water
expropriated by Mexico, in the approximate amount of US$320,124,350 to
US$667,687,930.00; or, in the alternative, full compensation for the economic
damages caused by Mexico's less favorable and unfair treatment of Claimants and
their Investment in the approximate amount of US$667,687,930 ... " Id. at 39.
21. NAFTA, supra note 10.
22. LESLIE ALAN GLICK, UNDERSTANDING THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
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would enable economic growth and increase jobs through foreign
investment.2 3 Chapter 11 of NAFTA, on foreign investments, is
one of the most innovative and essential Chapters for achieving
NAFTA's goals.24 Chapter 11 is also the focus of Bayview.25
1. Chapter 11: NAFTA's Regulations Regarding Investment
Chapter 11 has a very broad scope.26 It affords protection to
existing and future "investments of investors of another party"
An
made in the territory of another NAFTA party.27
"investment" includes everything from "an equity security of an
enterprise" to "real estate or other property (tangible or
intangible) acquired in the expectation or used for the purposes
of economic benefit or other business purposes.

'28

An "investor

AGREEMENT 3 (1993).
23. Id.
24. See generally FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NAFTA (Alan M. Rugman ed.,
1994). "Trade and investment flows are interdependent. To achieve the benefits of
economic liberalization, investment barriers must be addressed as comprehensively
as trade barriers. Hence, a chapter on investment was an essential element of an
agreement that was to provide for hemispheric free trade." Daniel M. Price, An
Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State
Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727, 727 (1993).
25. See generally Request for Arbitration,ICSID Case. No. ARB(AF)/05/1.
26. Price, supra note 24, at 727.
27. NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1101. See also Price, supra note 24, at 727.
28. NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1139. Article 1139 states in pertinent part:
[I]nvestment means:
(a) an enterprise;
(b) an equity security of an enterprise;
(c) a debt security of an enterprise;
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or
(ii) where the original maturity of the debt security is at least three
years, but does not include a debt security, regardless of original maturity,
or a state enterprise;
(d) a loan to an enterprise;
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or
(ii) where the original maturity of the debt security is at least three
years, but does not include a loan, regardless of original maturity, to a
state enterprise;
(e) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the
income or profits of the enterprise;
(f) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the
assets of that enterprise on dissolution, other than a debt security or a loan
excluded from subparagraph (c) or (d);
(g) real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the
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of a party" is any national of a NAFTA party who seeks to make,
makes, or has made an investment in another NAFTA country.2 9
Thus, Chapter 11 protects any investment owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by an investor of a party in another
NAFTA country.3"
Chapter 11 consists of two parts."
Part A contains the
substantive rules and rights that NAFTA parties must afford
"investments of an investor of a party" made in its county.32
Part B establishes the procedures for enforcing Part A's
substantive rights through investor-state arbitration of alleged
violations.3"
a. Chapter l's Substantive Rights
Part A mandates five principal rights that NAFTA parties
must afford investments of investors of parties: (1) national
treatment under Article 1102, (2) most favored nation treatment
under Article 1103, (3) a minimum standard of treatment under
Article 1105, (4) restrictions on performance requirements
under Article 1106, and (5) restrictions on the expropriation of
property under Article 1110." Bayview only deals with the
substantive rights set forth in Articles 1102, 1105, and 1110."
expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other business
purposes; and
(h) interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in
the territory of a Party to economic activity in such territory, such as under
(i) contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in the
territory of the Party, including turnkey or construction contracts, or
concessions, or
(ii) contracts where the remuneration depends substantially on the
production, revenues or profits of an enterprise ....
29. Id. Article 1139 states in pertinent part: "[I]nvestor of a Party means a
Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of such Party, that
seeks to make, is making, or has made an investment ......
30. Id. Article 1139 states in pertinent part: "[I]nvestment of an investor of a
Party means an investment owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an investor
of such Party .... "
31. Id. ch.11.
32. Id.
See also PHILIP T. VON MEHREN, CROSS-BORDER TRADE AND
INVESTMENT WITH MEXICO: NAFTA'S NEW RULES OF THE GAME 2 (1997).
33. NAFTA, supra note 10, ch. 11. See also VON MEHREN, supra note 32, at 2.
34. NAFTA, supra note 10, ch. 11; THE FIRST DECADE OF NAFTA: THE FUTURE
OF FREE TRADE IN NORTH AMERICA 272 (Kevin C. Kennedy ed., 2004).
35. See generally Claimants' Request for Arbitration Under the Rules
Governing the Additional Facility for the Admin. of Proceedings by the Int'l Ctr. for
Settlement of Inv. Disputes and the N. Am. Free Trade Agreement at 25-26, 40,
Bayview Irrigation Dist. et al. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/05/1 (Jan. 19, 2005), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/
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Therefore, most favored nation treatment and restrictions on
performance requirements will not be discussed in this
Comment.
National treatment under Article 1102 is the fundamental
obligation of Chapter 11." It seeks to prevent NAFTA parties
from favoring domestic investors or their investments by
requiring that all NAFTA parties treat foreign investors of a
party and their investments no less favorably than domestic
investors and their investments.37 This protection extends to
the "establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of
investments."3
Additionally, Article 1105 requires NAFTA countries to
afford investors of another party and their investments a
minimum standard of treatment "in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security."39 However, after a surge of
Chapter 11 arbitrations that broadly interpreted Article 1105's
language,4" the Free Trade Commission issued a binding
The
interpretation of Article 1105 on July 31, 2001.'
Texas/TexasClaimsNOA- 19-01-05.pdf.
36. See Price, supra note 24, at 728; VON MEHREN, supra note 32, at 3. NAFTA,
supra note 10, art. 1102(1) and (2) states in the pertinent part:
(1) Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments.
(2) Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to
investments of its own investors with respect to the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other
disposition of investments.
37. NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1102. See also Price, supra note 24, at 728; VON
MEHREN, supra note 32, at 3; THE FIRST DECADE OF NAFTA, supra note 34, at 272.
Examples of potential discrimination would include measures such as requiring
certain senior management positions to be held by domestic nationals or requiring a
minimum level of equity in the investment to be held by domestic nationals. Price,
supra note 24, at 729.
38. NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1102.
39. Id. art. 1105(1). See also THE FIRST DECADE OF NAFTA, supra note 34, at
273.
40. Todd Weiler, NAFTA Chapter 11 Jurisprudence: Coming Along Nicely, 9
Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 245, 246 (2002-2003).
41. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretationof Certain Chapter
11 Provisions, July 31, 2001, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/files/NAFTA
Comm_1i05_Transparency.pdf. The binding nature of the Free Trade Commission's
interpretation of Article 1105 is controversial and not wholly accepted. See Marcia
J. Staff & Christine W. Lewis, Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Past, Present,
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Commission's interpretation clarifies that the minimum
standard of treatment required under Article 1105 is the
standard which international law provides to aliens, and that a
breach of another international agreement or provision of
NAFTA does not establish a violation of Article 1105.42
Article 1110 regulates nationalization4 3 or expropriation" of
investments of an investor of a party. 5
It provides that
investments of investors from a signatory state may not be
nationalized or expropriated except for (1) a public purpose, (2)
on a nondiscriminatory basis, (3) in comport with due process of
law (i.e. 1105), and (4) upon adequate payment for the
expropriated property.4 6
and Future, 25 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 301, 326 (2003) (questioning binding nature of Free
Trade Commission's interpretation on Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals); Todd Weiler,
NAFTA Investment Law in 2001: As the Legal Order Starts to Settle, The
BureaucratsStrike Back, 36 INT'L LAW. 345, 347 (2002) (criticizing the Free Trade
Commission's interpretation as an attempt to amend NAFTA in violation of the
amendment process).
42. Id. The Commission's report states in pertinent part:
B. Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law
(1) Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to
be afforded to investments of investors of another Party.
(2) The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and
security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is
required by the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment of aliens.
(3) A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of
the NAFTA, or a separate international agreement, does not establish that
there has been a breach of Article 1105(1)
43. "The act of bringing an industry under governmental control or ownership."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1052 (8th ed. 2004).
44. "A governmental taking or modification of an individual's property rights
." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 621 (8th ed. 2004).
45. NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1110.
46. Id. See also THE FIRST DECADE OF NAFTA, supra note 34, at 275-76; Price,
supra note 24, at 730. Article 1110 states in pertinent part:
(1)
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an
investment of an investor or another party in its territory or take a
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment.. . except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2
through 6.
(2)

Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the
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b. Chapter 1I's Dispute Resolution Mechanism
Section B of Chapter 11 allows an investor from a party to
submit an arbitral claim against a foreign NAFTA party,
alleging it has violated one or more of the substantive rules of
Part A.47 This is one of the most innovative aspect of Chapter 11
because it allows individual investors to pursue claims for
monetary damages directly against a NAFTA country.48 Three
pretexts must exist for an investor of a party to be able to bring
an arbitral claim. First, only an investor from a party holding a
foreign investment in another NAFTA country may bring a
claim under Chapter 11." Second, the investor of another party
only has three years from the time the investor first acquired, or
should have first acquired, knowledge of the alleged
infringement of Chapter 11 to bring the claim. 0 Third, each
investor must consent to the arbitration of the claim in writing
and serve a copy on the disputing NAFTA country.5 ' However,
no such written consent is needed from a NAFTA country
because "[e]ach [NAFTA] Party consents to the submission of a
request for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this
Subchapter."5 2
B. INTERNATIONAL ALLOCATION OF THE RIO GRANDE (RIO
BRAVO) BETWEEN THE UNITED STATED AND MEXICO
On February 3, 1944 the United States and Mexico signed
the Treaty Regarding Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado
and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (1944 Treaty). 3 The
purpose of the 1944 Treaty as stated in its preamble is as
follows:
The Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the United Mexican States . . . considering that the utilization of

expropriated investment immediately before expropriation took place ....
47. NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1116. See also VON MEHREN, supra note 32, at
212.
48. See NAFTA, supra note 10, arts. 1116, 1117, 1119; VON MEHREN, supra
note 32, at 220.
49. NAFTA, supra note 10, arts. 1116 & 1117. See also VON MEHREN, supra
note 32, at 213.
50. NAFTA, supra note 10, arts. 1116(2) & 1117(2). See also VON MEHREN,
supranote 32, at 213.
51. NAFTA, supra note 10, arts. 1121 & 1122.
52. Id. art. 1122.
53. Treaty Regarding Utilization of the Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers
and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-MEX., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter 1944
Treaty].
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these waters [the Colorado, Tijuana, and Rio Grande Rivers] . . . is

desirable [and] in the interest of both countries, and desiring,
moreover, to fix and delimit the rights of the two countries with
respect to the waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, and of the
Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) from Fort Quitman, Texas ....
to the Gulf of
Mexico, in order to obtain the most complete and satisfactory
utilization thereof, have resolved to conclude a treaty ... 54

Article 4 allocates the waters of the Rio Grande and its
tributaries among the United States and Mexico from Fort
Quitman, Texas to the Gulf of Mexico.55 Under Article 4, Mexico
must deliver one-third of the flow of six Rio Grande tributaries
which originate in Mexico 56 to the United States.57 However, the
average annual water delivery must be no less than 350,000
acre-feet per year, averaged over five consecutive years (or a
total of 1.75 million acre-feet of water every 5 years).58 If an
"extraordinary drought" prevents Mexico from meeting its
delivery requirements to the United States, a water debt to the
United States is created which may be paid during the next fiveyear cycle. 59 This roll over does not excuse Mexico from its
obligation to deliver the indebted water or the 1.75 million acrefeet required during the second five-year cycle.6" It simply
allows Mexico additional time to deliver the full 1.75 million
acre-feet from the first cycle. 6 However, if U.S. storage in the
two uppermost international dams, Falcon Dam and Amistad
Dam, reach capacity, any Mexican water debt is forgiven and a
new 5 year cycle begins.62 In spite of this, the 1944 Treaty is
silent regarding what constitutes an "extraordinary drought"
and whether a "roll over" beyond a second five year cycle can
63
occur.

54.

Id.

55. Id. art. 4.
56. The six Rio Grande tributaries are the Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo,
Escondido, Salado, and Las Vacas Arroyo Rivers. Id.
57. 1944 Treaty, supra note 53, art. 4. See also Carlos Marin, Bi-national
Border Water Supply Issues From the Perspectiveof the IBWC, 11 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 35,
35 (2003).

58.

1944 Treaty, supra note 53, art. 4. See also Marin, supra note 57, at 35;

Stephen P. Mumme, Developing Treaty Compatible Watershed Management Reforms
for the U.S.-Mexico Border: The Case for Strengthening the InternationalBoundary
and Water Commission, 30 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 929, 931 (2005).
59. 1944 Treaty, supra note 53, art. 4. See also Mumme, supra note 58, at 931.
60. 1944 Treaty, supra note 53, art. 4. See also Mumme, supra note 58, at 931.
61. 1944 Treaty, supra note 53, art. 4. See also Mumme, supra note 58, at 931.
62. 1944 Treaty, supra note 53, art. 4. See also Mumme, supra note 58, at 931.

63.

1944 Treaty, supra note 53, art. 4. Article 4 states in relevant part:
In the event of extraordinary drought or serious accident to the hydraulic
systems on the measured Mexican tributaries, making it difficult for
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In addition, Article 2 of the 1944 Treaty created the
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) which
is entrusted with: (1) implementing the 1944 Treaty's terms, (2)
application of the regulations, rights, and obligations which
Mexico and the United States assumed under the 1944 Treaty,
and (3) settlement of all disputes to which observance and
execution of the 1944 Treaty may give rise. 5 Thus, Article 2 and
the IBWC constitute the sole dispute resolution mechanism for
all disputes arising under the 1944 Treaty.
Further, the IBWC provides a procedure called the Minute
Process for reaching bi-national interpretation of the 1944
Under the Minute
Treaty, its obligations, and its terms.6
Process, the IBWC has the power to interpret and expand the
1944 Treaty to deal with particular problems in implementation
by issuing binding minutes.
IBWC minutes function, for all
intents and purposes, as amendments to the 1944 Treaty. 8
Further, to issue a binding minute, the IBWC need only receive
the consent of each country's foreign ministries. 9 Legislative
Treaty approval from either country is not usually required."
C. MEXICO'S WATER DEBT UNDER THE 1944 TREATY
During the five-year cycle from 1992-1997, Mexico failed to
meet its water delivery requirements to the United States under

Mexico to make available the run-off of 350,000 acre-feet (431,721,000
cubic meters) annually . . . any deficiencies existing at the end of the
aforesaid five-year cycle shall be made up in the following five-year cycle
with water from the said measured tributaries...
Whenever the conservation capacities assigned to the United States in at
least two of the major international reservoirs, including the highest major
reservoir, are filled with waters belonging to the United States, a cycle of
five years shall be considered as terminated and all debits fully paid,
whereupon a new five-year cycle shall commence.
64. In reality Article 2 simply changed the name of the International Boundary
Commission, created by the United States and Mexico on March 1, 1889, to deal
with disputes over the location of the border, to the International Boundary and
Water Commission and gave it additional duties as discussed in the text above.
1944 Treaty, supra note 53, art. 2.
65. Id.
See also International Boundary and Water Commission, The
International Boundary and Water Commission, Its Mission, Organization and
Procedures for
Solution of Boundary Water Problems, available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/About-us.pdf. (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
66. Mumme, supra note 58, at 935.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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the terms of the 1.944 Treaty.7 ' In so doing, Mexico accrued a
water debt of approximately 1.024 million acre-feet with the
United States. In accordance with Article 4 of the 1944 Treaty,
the United States allowed the Mexican water debt to roll over to
the 1997-2002 five-year cycle. However, an official declaration
of "extraordinary drought" was never made.74 In 1999, with the
1992-1997 debt still pending, Mexico officially and unilaterally
declared a state of extraordinary drought.75 In its declaration,
Mexico argued that the extraordinary drought absolved it of any
and all Article 4 obligations, but that it would try to restore
normal Treaty delivery and make good on its debt if "Mother
Nature" cooperated.76
The United States rejected this
proposition and argued Mexico was bound by Article 4
irrespective of extraordinary drought. 7 By the expiration of the
1997-2002 cycle, Mexico's water debt had grown to
approximately 1.5 million acre feet, which the United States
has agreed to let roll over into a third consecutive cycle.79
Moreover, at the time of the third roll over, the IBWC issued
minute 308 which was designed to help Mexico pay off its water
debt.8 ° Largely as a result of IBWC minute 308, Mexico paid off
its water debt as of 2005 and is current with all 2002-2007 cycle
deliveries. 8'
However, many in the United States, Texas in particular,
believe Mexico's obligatory and belated repayment of the water

71. Id. at 933.
72. Marin, supra note 57, at 36.
73. Mumme, supra note 58, at 933.
74. Mexico believed the status of "extraordinary drought" had been conceded by
the United States, arguing that if it had not been conceded the United States could
not have allowed roll over, but rather would have had to declare Mexico in default on
the Treaty. Id. at 933 n.8.
75. Id. at 933.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Matin, supra note 57, at 36.
79. Mumme, supra note 58, at 933. Mexico argues that its obligation under the
third roll over to pay down the water debt is based on international comity, and is a
moral rather than legal obligation. Id. It bases this argument on the 1999
declaration of extraordinary drought. Id.
80. United States Allocation of Rio Grande Waters During the Last Year of the
Current Cycle, IBWC Minute no. 308 (June 28, 2002), available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files[MinutesMin308.pdf. (Minute 308 obligates both
countries to invest in water conservation systems in Mexico.). See also Mumme,
supra note 58, at 933-34.
81. Mexico's Rio Grande Water Debt Repaid, U.S. WATER NEWS ONLINE, Oct.
2005, available at http://www.uswaternews.com/archives/arcgloball
5mexirioxl0.html.
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debt is insufficient.8 2
They argue that repayment of the
indebted water does not compensate them for the harm caused
by Mexico's failure to meet its delivery requirements.83 They
assert that this failure to meet the requirements of the 1944
Treaty irrefutably caused farmers in Texas's Lower Rio Grande
84
Valley to suffer extreme financial and agricultural loss.
Studies support this position, showing that as a result of the
Mexican water debt the Lower Rio Grande Valley lost 30,000
jobs and that approximately 1,720 farmers lost $11 million in
crops per year, totaling more than $1 billion in net losses to the
region between 1992-2002." 5 Further, studies indicate that if
Texas had received standard water delivery under the 1944
Treaty, it would have gained 3,000 jobs and $80 million in
personal income during the same period. 6 Furthermore, during
the same time period, Mexico increased its total irrigated
acreage by 3% in Chihuahua alone, and replaced its typical
crops of grains, soybeans, and cotton with more profitable and
water consumptive crops such as alfalfa, melons, fruits, and
nuts. 7

82. Jill Warren, Mexico's Compliance With the 1944 Water Treaty Between the
United States and Mexico: A Texas Perspective, 11 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 41, 41-42 (2003);
Paul Krza, Texas Water Case is 'Takings' on Steroids, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 21,
2005, availableat http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.PrintableArticle?articleid=15295.
83. Mumme, supra note 58, at 934; Warren, supra note 82, at 41-42; Paul
Krza, Texas Water Case is 'Takings' on Steroids, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 21,
2005, availableat http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.PrintableArticle?article-id=
15295.
84. Warren, supra note 82, at 42.
85. See Steve Taylor, U.S. Hopes Mexico's Water Debt Moves from War of Words
to Plan of Action, BROWNSVILLE HERALD, May 19, 2002 available at
http://old.brownsvilleherald.com/community-comments.php?id=P2394_0_3__C;
Steve Taylor, Study: Water Debt Has Cost Jobs, VALLEY MORNING STAR, Oct. 3, 2002
available at http://new.valleystar.com/articles/2002/10/03/export45841.txt;
Press
Release, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Comptroller Report Shows Mexico
Water Debt Costs South Texas Jobs (Oct. 2,
2002),
available at
http://www.window.state.tx.us/news/21002mexwater.html;
C. Parr Rosson, III,
Aaron Hobbs & Flynn Adcock, A Preliminary Assessment of Crop Production and
Estimated IrrigationUse for Chihuahua,Mexico, at 2-6 (May 2, 2002) (Department
of Agricultural Economics, Center for North American Studies of Texas A&M
University), available at http://cnas.tamu.edu/publications/ChiWater.pdf.
86. See Taylor, supra note 85; Texas Comptroller press release, supra note 85;
Rosson, supra note 85, at 2-6.
87. Rosson et al., supra note 85, at 2-6. See also Warren, supra note 82, at 42-
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II. CLAIMANTS' ARGUMENTS FOR TREATING NATURAL
FLOWING WATER AS A "GOOD" SUBJECT TO THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW OF NAFTA
The Claimants allege to be the owners of an "integrated
investment," which includes rights to water located in Mexico
and various farms, farm equipment, and facilities to store and
distribute the water in the United States.88 Further, they assert
the water located in Mexico is the "foundation" for their
"integrated investment," the rest of which becomes unusable
without it.89 Moreover, the Claimants argued they have an
absolute property right to the water because they have paid
"substantial sums for the purchase of water rights, the delivery
of water, and the administration of the water system through
the [Texas] Water Master."9 Therefore, Claimants believe their
integrated investment qualifies as an investment in "real estate
or other property (tangible or intangible) acquired in the
expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other
business purposes," under Article 1138(g) of NAFTA.9 If one
accepts the above argument that the Claimants "integrated
investment" is an investment in property for the purposes of
NAFTA, it could then be argued that Mexico's retention of Rio
Grande water violates Articles 1102, 1105, and 1110 of NAFTA.
For example, Article 1102 requires a NAFTA party to treat
its own investors no differently than foreign investors in like
circumstances.92 Claimants could argue that by withholding the
water which forms the foundation of their investment and
providing it to Mexican farmers, Mexico has afforded Claimants
less favorable treatment than it has afforded Mexican water
investors in like circumstances. Similarly, Article 1105 requires
each NAFTA party to afford the investments of investors from
another party treatment in accordance with international law. 3
Claimants could argue that Mexico's clear failure to adhere to
88. Request for Arbitration, supra note 14, at 27.
89. Id. at 32, 37-38.
90. Id. at 27; see also United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725,
753 (1950) ("[The right to irrigate land is] a recognized and adjudicated private
property right"); Bigham Bros. v. Port Arthur Canal & Dock Co., 97 S.W. 686, 688
(Tex. 1906) ("The right of a riparian owner to take water from the stream is
property"). The Texas Water Master is a government officer appointed by the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality, and he is charged with monitoring,
authorizing, and regulating Texas water rights. Request for Arbitration, supra note
14, at 27 n.2.
91. See supra notes 28-30, & 90 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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its water delivery obligations under the 1944 Treaty is a per se
violation of international law as set forth in the 1944 treaty, and
therefore a violation of Article 1105. Finally, Article 1110 bars
countries from expropriating investments of another party's
investors or taking measures that are tantamount to
expropriation,
unless there is due process and just
compensation.
Claimants could argue that Mexico either
expropriated the foundation to their integrated investment or
took actions tantamount to expropriation when it withheld
Claimants' water and gave the water to Mexican farmers
without compensating them.
Upon initial assessment of Bayview's potential arguments
for subjecting the waters of the Rio Grande to the international
trade law of NAFTA, one may think these arguments seem
reasonable. However, as the next section demonstrates, these
arguments are problematic, beyond the scope of NAFTA, and
inconsistent with principles of international law. Therefore,
they should be disregarded.
III. WATER FLOWING IN ITS NATURAL STATE SHOULD
NOT BE SUBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW,
SUCH AS NAFTA
A. CLAIMANTS' REQUEST FOR ARBITRATION EXCEEDS THE SCOPE
OF NAFTA BECAUSE CLAIMANTS Do NOT OWN AN "INVESTMENT"
IN MEXICO
Chapter l's investor-state dispute resolution mechanism is
not a forum for all complaints against a NAFTA party.95 Article
1101 clearly limits the scope of Chapter 11 to arbitration of
measures adopted or maintained by a NAFTA Party relating to
"investments of investors of another Party made in the territory
of the Party."96 This limited scope is apparent in Articles 1102,
1105, and 1110, among others.
For example: Article 1102
requires only National Treatment for "investments [or investors]
of another party"; Article 1105 requires only a minimum
standard of treatment for "investments of investors of another
Party;" and Article 1110 likewise bars only expropriation of
"investments of investors."97 Therefore, Claimants must own an
94.
95.
96.
97.

See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
See supra notes 36, 39 & 46 (emphasis added).
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"investment" in Mexico in order to have any remedy for their
claims under NAFTA. This in turn requires the free flowing
waters of the Rio Grande's tributaries to be ownable as an
investment in Mexico.
Contrary to the Claimants' belief that they own an
investment of water in Mexico under Article 1138(g), they do not
in fact "own" anything in Mexico, let alone an investment in
water. It is a basic principle of international law that nation
states are sovereign over their territory and laws.9" This means
that one nation state may not exercise its sovereign power in
any form in the territory of another nation state.9 9 Therefore,
the United States lacks the ability to create property rightswhether in water or otherwise-in Mexico and Mexico lacks the
ability to create property rights in the United States. ° Thus, a
determination of ownership or investment in water that is
located in Mexico is governed by the laws of Mexico, not the
laws of the United States or Texas. Consequently, the rights
Claimants have acquired to use the water of the Rio Grande
once it reaches Texas and the status of those water rights as
property under Texas law are irrelevant. Only ownership rights
created under Mexican law are relevant. Therefore, to "own"
the water of the Rio Grande tributaries as an investment
located in Mexico, the Claimants must own the water located in
Mexico under Mexican law.
This argument cannot be undermined by the international
water law principle of equitable apportionment, which requires
the recognition of Claimants' rights to the water once it reaches
the United States. This is so despite equitable apportionment
rejecting absolute territorial sovereignty over international
waters and requiring water crossing international borders to be
equitably apportioned among the riparian states.'
First,
equitable apportionment only requires apportionment between
98. Shannon K. Baruch, The Proposed FloridaNonindigenous Species Statute:
A Salvation for the Lacy Act, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 185, 205 (1995) ('The most stringent
restriction that international law imposes on a sovereign state is that one nation
state may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another.").
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See Helsinki Rules, art. IV, 52 I.L.A. 484 (1967), available at
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/IntlDocs/HelsinkiRules.htm; Yonatan Lupu,
InternationalLaw and the Waters of the Euphrates and Tigris, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 349, 359-66 (2001); Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiat or Custom: The Checkered
Development of International Water Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45, 68-73 (1991);
Press Release, United Nations General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts
Convention on Laws of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N.
Doc. GA/9248 (May 21, 1997).
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"riparian states" not riparian users, and the 1944 Treaty has
equitably apportioned the water of the Rio Grande and its
tributaries between the United States and Mexico in accordance
with international law.' 2 Second, equitable apportionment has
no bearing on this issue; the argument is not that Mexico has
absolute sovereignty to withhold water from the United Statesit is that Mexico has absolute sovereignty to determine the laws
of private property in Mexico.
Moreover, the 1944 Treaty did not give the Claimants rights
to water on .the Rio Grande. Courts have repeatedly held that
the 1944 Treaty did not grant water rights to individual users,
but rather that it merely apportioned the water of the Rio
Grande between the United States and Mexico.' °3 In fact, the
courts have consistently held that "each nation should be left
the power of making determinations, pursuant to its own law, of
those who are, may become, or cease to be, entitled to the use of
the waters secured by the [1944] treaty."'"
As the above
discussion makes clear, the relevant inquiry for the purposes of
determining the validity of a potential arbitration of the
Bayview claims under Chapter 11 is whether the Claimants own
an investment in the water of the Rio Grande under Mexican
law, not under U.S. law.
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution states, "[o]wnership
of the lands and waters within the boundaries of the national
territory is vested originally in the Nation." ' 5 It clarifies that
"[tihe Nation has domain over . . . rivers and their direct and
indirect tributaries, as of the place in the river bed where
permanent, intermittent, or torrential flow of water starts and
up to the river's mouth in the national property."'0 6
One
commentator has gone as far as to say virtually "all of the water
in Mexico except for rainfall, and 0only
before it hits the ground,
7
is deemed to be 'national waters.""
102. 1944 Treaty, supra note 53, art. IV; Warren, supra note 82, at 41 ("The
treaty equitably distributes between the United States and Mexico the waters of the
Rio Grande River from Fort Quitman, Texas to the Gulf of Mexico.").
103. See, e.g., Texas v. Hidalgo County Water Control Improvement Dist. No.
Eighteen, 443 S.W.2d 728, 742 (Tex. App. 1969) ("[T]he United States did not by the
[19441 [T]reaty confer on anyone a right emanating from the central government to
make use of the waters of the Rio Grande.").
104. Hidalgo County Water Control Improvement Dist. No. Seven v. Hedrick,
226 F.2d 1, 7 (5th Cir. 1955).
105. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as
amended Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.) at art.
27 [hereinafter Mexican Constitution].
106. Id.
107. Abdon Hernandez, Water Law in the Republic of Mexico, 11 U.S. -MEX. L. J.
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While Mexico retains the ability to transfer title of national
waters to private parties, "ownership by the Nation is
inalienable and imprescriptible, and the exploitation, use, or
appropriation of the resources concerned [i.e. water], by private
persons or by companies . . . may not be undertaken except

through concessions granted by the Federal Executive, in
accordance with rules and conditions established by law.' ' 8
Thus, for Claimants to own or hold an investment in water
located in Mexico, they must have received a "concession" from
the Federal Executive of Mexico in accordance with the laws of
Mexico.
The National Waters Law (NWL) of Mexico affirms the
National ownership of waters under the Constitution and is
considered the most important piece of Mexican water
legislation." 9 The NWL dictates the requirements for receiving
a concession for urban use, agriculturaluse, power generation,
and other productive activities."' To receive an agricultural
concession, a private party or corporate entity must own
agricultural lands, cattle, or forestlands in Mexico."'
Not a single Bayview Claimant owns agricultural lands,
cattle, or forestlands in Mexico or claims to own such."2 Thus, it
is legally impossible under the NWL for the Claimants to have
owned or held an investment in water in Mexico. Further, since
the Claimants do not own or hold an investment in Mexico, it
would be impossible for Mexico to have violated Articles 1102,
1105, and 1110 of NAFTA, as these provisions require the
existence of an "investment of an investor of another party."' '3
Therefore, allowing a NAFTA tribunal to arbitrate
Bayview's claims would greatly exceed the scope of NAFTA.
First, it would allow for arbitration of a claim under Chapter 11
when there is no recognizable foreign investment in violation of
Chapter l's
prerequisites for investor-state arbitration."4
Moreover, even if the tribunal determined that a foreign
investment existed, thus avoiding the above problem, it would
nonetheless still exceed the scope of NAFTA and violate general
principles of international law by usurping Mexico's private
property laws and sovereign authority. NAFTA's intended
15, 18 (2003).
108. Mexican Constitution, supra note 105, art. 27.
109. Hernandez, supra note 107, at 18.
110. Id. 20-21.
111. Id. at 21.
112. See generally supra note 14, at 1-25.
113. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.

20081

BAYVIEW AND THE INT'L TRADE IN WATER

purpose was to remove trade barriers while preserving parties'
sovereignty over their territory and substantive laws." ' Thus, if
a tribunal determined that the Claimants did in fact own an
investment in water in Mexico, therefore allowing the
Claimants to seek an investor-state arbitration, it would
unilaterally alter Mexican water law in the face of Mexico's
Constitution. In essence, the NAFTA tribunal would be saying
that private ownership of Mexican water in the United States by
the Bayview Claimants gives them actionable private property
rights to the water while it remains in Mexico, irrespective of
what the Mexican Constitution says. This is a clear usurpation
of Mexican sovereign authority and therefore a violation of
NAFTA's scope and the general international law principles as
set forth above.
Bayview is exemplary of problems which may arise any time
water flowing in its natural state is considered a "good" subject
to international trade laws such as NAFTA. As this section has
shown, international trade regimes are not well equipped to
address the potential for conflicts over territorially sovereignty
and are limited in their scope to things that have truly entered
international commerce as a commodity or truly constitute an
investment. Therefore, unless water has truly entered the
international market as a commodity or is truly owned as a
foreign investment, it should not be governed by international
trade law. If water is considered a good subject to international
trade law in circumstances other than when it has truly entered
commerce, such as when it is flowing in its natural state, there
is a real potential that trade regimes will grossly exceed their
scope and infringe upon nation-states sovereign authority when
addressing disputes arising over this scarce resource.
B. ARBITRATION BY A NAFTA TRIBUNAL WOULD PRESUME A
VIOLATION OF THE TREATY WHERE NONE EXISTED, USURP THE
POWER OF THE IBWC, AND ALTER THE TERMS OF THE 1944
TREATY
As demonstrated in the previous section, if water flowing in
its natural state across an international border is subject to
international trade law, the dispute resolution mechanisms of
international trade regimes would be available to resolve water
disputes." 6 Although this may seem like an appealing method
115. GLICK, supra note 22.
116. Edith Brown Weiss, Water Transfers and International Trade Law, in
FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 61, 83 (Edith Brown Weiss et al.
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to reduce the potential for armed water conflicts that many
scholars predict, "7 it would likely destabilize the international
system by undermining the practical significance and authority
of treaties apportioning the use of water between countries.
While there has been surprisingly little attention given to
this issue, the consensus is that allowing international trade
bodies to resolve international water disputes presents
problems."' For example, granting trade bodies jurisdiction to
resolve international water disputes may encourage forum
shopping between trade bodies and treaty dispute resolution
mechanisms. In addition, trade bodies may lack the expertise to
adequately resolve international water disputes." 9 These vices
of allowing free flowing water to be subject to international
trade law can readily be seen in the context of Bayview.
For example, as discussed above, Mexico's water debt was
resolved under the terms of the 1944 Treaty and IBWC minute
308.12° However, many in Texas, including the Claimants, did
not believe this Treaty resolution to be a satisfactory resolution
of the dispute.2 ' Thus, they utilized an alternative dispute
resolution forum-namely NAFTA's Chapter 11 investor-state
dispute mechanism. The ramifications of this type of forum
shopping in relation to water flowing in its natural state raise
many concerns.
One issue Bayview illuminates is that allowing trade bodies
to resolve international water disputes may potentially alter the
terms and obligations of water treaties by creating liability
where none existed under the terms of the treaty. For example,
the Bayview Claimants' entire argument is based on the idea
that they were harmed by the creation of the Mexican water
debt.'22 Thus, in order to arbitrate the Bayview dispute, the
eds., Oxford University Press, 2005).
117. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Some scholars argue that water
flowing in its natural state should be subject to international trade dispute
mechanisms because it would help to more equitably distribute the world's water
while at the same time ensuring countries could not "discriminate in favor of water
from one country over that from another by imposing differential tariffs or
quantitative limitations." See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 116, at 80.
118. Weiss, supra note 116, at 82-83.
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
122. Request for Arbitration, supra note 14,
61-76. The following are some
highlights that particularly demonstrate this point. "Mexico further withheld fair
and equitable treatment from Claimants by flagrantly violating the 1944 Treaty."
Id.
61. "Under article 1105 ... Respondent's intentional violation of the 1944
Treaty (to the substantial damage of Claimants) is a clear violation of international
law." Id.
73. "This claim submitted for arbitration accrued in October 2002, when
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NAFTA tribunal would have to accept that the Mexican water
debt did, or at least could have, abridged the Claimants'
Chapter 11 rights. This is problematic because the 1944 Treaty
by its very terms allows for the legal creation of a water debt."'
By arbitrating Bayview, a NAFTA tribunal would in essence be
altering, without the official consent of either Mexico or the
United States, the meaning and obligations of the 1944 Treaty.
It would potentially be creating a trade liability for accruing a
water debt under the 1944 Treaty when the Treaty itself
explicitly allows for the creation of such a debt under its terms.
With Bayview as an example, the absurdity of allowing this
type of forum shopping and extralegislative rewriting of treaties
Allowing trade bodies to potentially and
is apparent.
unilaterally write into treaties individual rights of action and
monetary damages of upwards of $600,000,000 seems irrational
and counter productive to fostering cooperative allocation of
international water. Further, when one considers that there
have been over 145 separate water allocation treaties enacted in
the last 140 years, problems of creating disincentives for
cooperation on water issues are amplified. If the terms of
common international water allocation treaties cannot be
counted on as secure, due to trade law forum shopping, the
incentive to enter water allocation treaties will be diminished.
This is a step in the wrong direction. The best way to avoid
international conflict over water is to have the affected states
agree on an equitable allocation of the naturally flowing water,
the liability for failing to meet the terms of the treaty, and the
If this process is
specific dispute resolution mechanism.
undermined, the likelihood of international conflict would
consequently rise because of an utter absence of agreement with
respect to the use of water.
CONCLUSION
As can be seen through Bayview IrrigationDistrict et al. v.
United Mexican States, considering free flowing water that
crosses an international border a "good" subject to international
trade law is problematic and should be avoided. As has been
shown through the context of Bayview, making free flowing
water subject to international trade law would greatly exceed
Mexico's water debt (which is owned almost entirely by Claimants) became
delinquent. This water debt arose under the 1944 Treaty, which allocated the
waters of the Rio Grande River and its tributaries." Id. 60.
123. See 1944 Treaty, supra note 53, art. IV.
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the scope of international trade regimes, potentially usurp
nation-states' territorial sovereignty, foster dispute resolution
forum shopping, and allow for unilateral rewriting of water
allocation treaties by trade bodies. For these reasons, only
water that has actually entered commerce-such as bottled
water or water included as an ingredient or component to some
good in commerce-should be subjected to the laws of
international trade regimes such as NAFTA. Therefore, the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
correctly denied jurisdiction over Bayview.

